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RESUMO
Nest� trabalho exa�inamos a natureza interdependente during entre as metas de crescimento economico e desigualdade regional.
I. I NTRODUCT! ON
National policy goals throughout the world typically include the promotion of economic growth and the reduction of domestic re gional inequalities. Even though neoclassical regional growth mo dels indicate that regional per capita incomes will converge in the long run due to factor migration and that eqUilibrium growth rates are basically limited by population growth rates, many gove� ments are either doubtful of these conclusions or unwilling (or unable) to wait for the long-run convergence of regional incomes and the achievem:ent of equilibrium growth. As a result policies are adopted to both promote national grmlth and to alleviate the regi� nal inequities which exist. unfortunately, the economic models used to analyze these problems and to develop policies to correct them often neglect the basic interrelationships betvleen the national and regional policies and circumstances. This neglect often leads to the adoption of policies which are conflicting, rather than compl� mentary, with respect to the policy goals.
In this paper, the interrelated nature of the gro"lth and re gional in equali ty goals is examined in section II. Then, the inter dependencies between simultaneous pursuit of national growth and regional equality, and the possible complementary or conflicting results of exogenous events and macroeconomic policies toward tho se ends are analyzed in section III. These interdependencies are discussed and illustrated through the use of a simple two-region aggregate demand model. As an application of the previous analysis, a case study of Brazil's experience during the 1960 I s and 1970 I s is presented in section IV.
II. NATIONAL GRO!HH AND REGIONAL INEQUALITY: THE &ASIC INTERDEPENDENCY
To i.llustrate the relationship between national growth regiO nal ineqL1ality a general case of � regions could be considered; ho wever, tD simplify the exposition, assume two regions (il. and B)
where region A is poorer than region B. To further simplify the argument/ assume either that the population growth rates for both regions and the nation are the same, or that total rather than per capita income is the appropriate measure for judging regional ine quality and national growth l . In addition assume that the policy goals of the government are to promote high national growth rates or, alternatively, large proportional changes in national income and to reduce the inequality between the two regions 2 .
To formally develop the interdependency between these two goals, define the following variables:
Ya ( (1)
Verbally, these relationships show that the national growth rate is a weighted average of the regional growth rates 1 while chan ges in the measure of regional inequality are determined by the difference between the growth rates. It fy how conflicts between the two policy is now possible to identiobjectives may arise.
Reduction of regional inequality requires that R move toward 1, i !E:
plying that ?a > ?b is necessary for a reduction of regional inequality 3 .
wever, by A high national growth rate is most easily attained, hogreater growth in region growth rate (1 -a) is greater than B since the weight on region B's the weight on region A I S growth rate (u). Thus, there is a trade-off between the �ahe of achieving any given national gro\vth rate and the reduction of regional ine quality; however, it is still clearly possible to satisfy both goals. Subs titution of equations 7 into equations 1 and 2 results in the following expressions for the national growth rate and the pe� cent age change in regional inequality in terms of the exogenous and policy va riables: 
III. POLICY CONFLICT OR COMPLEMENTARITY
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IV. POLICY CONFLICT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE
The ideas developed in the last section regarding policy con flict or complementarity are applied to the case of Brazil in this section. As is well documented in the literature dealing with Bra zil's economic development, Brazil has had severe regional imbala� ces and a generally successful growth experience over the past fifteen years 6 . It has also been recognized that many of the poli cies adopted to promote national growth may have had adverse effec ts on the regional problem 7 .
The model used to evaluate the effects of Brazil's economic policies on growth and regional inequality is analogous to the mo del presented in the last section 8 . Region A is the Brazilian Nor� heast and Region B is the rest-of-Brazil. The structural equations underlying the regional expenditure functions follow the standard Keynesian formulations except for the inclusion of Brazil's export and fiscal incentive systems 9 . Table 2 . Examination of the CCRT values shows that the net effect of the policy vector was complemen tary in three of the five subperiods (1965-67, 1970-74, and 1974-77) , while it was conflicting in two subperiods (1967-70 and 1977-80) . Except for the 1965-67 period, however, the intensity of both the complementary and conflicting effects have been relat� Since the policy variables have had a relatively small effect on national growth, it is reasonable to ask if they have had fa vorable impacts on regional inequality. As is clear from the last portion of �able 5, in the periods when these policies were contr� ctionary with respect to growth (1965-67, 1970-74, and 1974-77 again ran counter to those of the exogenous variables, thus acting to worsen regional ine quality.
The result that Brazil's domestic policies have made relati vely small contributions to her induced growth, while the contribu tion of foreigner income has been large, may be viewed by some as surprising. The information in Table 6 provides the basis for ex plaining this resul t. The top half of Table 6 
Brazil's
The policy variables's relatively small contribution to indu ced growth comes from two sources. First, their growth rate coeff! cients are relatively small. Second, and most importantly, the po licies have been contradictory in terms of their effects on growth.
As is clear from Table 6 The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that the Braz�lian authorities have had very little success at coordina ting the�r policy mix to both stimulate growth and improve the re gional di.stribution of the national product. The major contrihut.ing factor to Brazilian growth over these fifteen years has been the favorable growth performance of the United States which is totally outside the control of Brazil's macro-policymakers. For the subperiods when Brazil's macro-p:Jlicy has had net stimulative effects on the economy, it has had negative effects on regional distribu tion, while the reverse has been true for the periods vlhen there were net contractionary effects from the macro-policies. Thus, at least for this fifteen year periodl the slope of the curve showing the possible combinations of national grovlth and regional distribu tion has been negative. (1,) The variables labelled "Policy/Exogenous" are neither purely policy nor pu rely exogenous variables si ne' they are determined both by policy actions and by other exogenous forces, hence the combined classification. Although a variable's growth rate is technically different than the proportional change in that variable, the two terms will be used synomously in this paper.
3.
It should be noted that inequality can worsen even though the regional income levels are increasing. This situation is ana logous to the fact that the Gini coefficient for the personal income distribution can increase while the levels of personal income of all individuals are increasing.
4.
The condition that Ei 1 + Ej 2 < for the model's stability. See pretation of these conditions. is a sufficient condition Appendix I for proof and inter
5.
The Totnl or Aggregate Complementarity-Conflict ratio is deri ved by dividing equation 9 by equation 8 and simplifying.
6.
For a review of this literature see Harber (1982 a) .
7.
For example, see Haddad and Andrade (1974) , Rebou�as Baer and Geiger (1978) , and Martin and Schuh (1978) .
The model is a synthesis and extension of the models analyzed in Harber (1982a) and Harber (1982 b) . The parameter estimates presefrted below are also drawn from these works.
9.
See Appendix II for the presentation of the structural equations and Harber (1982a) for a detailed discussion of Brazil's in centive programs.
10. The result that the pure policy variables had negative effect s one growth in the 1965-67, 1970-74 and 1974-77 o.
Using the standard interpretation of Keynesian product market equilibrium, treating Ya and Yh as production levels and Fa and Fb as total net purchases, then the disequilibrium adjustment proces ses are as follows:
For a given level of Ya, if Yb is such that Ya > «) Fa(Ya,Yb\ then production exceeds (falls short of) purcheses so that stocks are accumulating (decumulating) in Region A and pr.:: duct ion is decreased (increased); and ii)
For a given level of Yb, if Ya is such that Yb > «) Fb(Yb ,Ya) , then production exceeds (falls slort of) purchases so that stocks are accumulating (decumulating) in Region B and pr� duct ion is decreased (increased) .
The equilibrium conditions given above can the used define the combinations of Ya and Yb satisfying these conditions. Totally dif ferentiating the equilibrium condit ions yields the following ex pressions for the slopes of these equilibrium loci: Substitution of the expressions for the partial derivatives of the Fi functions and manipulation of this expression shows that the rno del's stability guarantees that the denominator of the coefficients in equations 7, 8, and 9 are positive. It is also easily shown that a sufficient condition for stability is These conditions simply state that the change in non-trade, direct expenditures in both regions resulting from a change in either re gion's income is less than the initial change it income. 
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